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The first generation of genetically modified (GM) crop varieties sought to
increase farmer profitability through cost reductions or higher yields. The
next generation of GM food research is focusing also on breeding for
attributes of interest to consumers, beginning with ‘golden rice’, which has
been genetically engineered to contain a higher level of vitamin A and
thereby boost the health of unskilled labourers in developing countries. This
paper analyses empirically the potential economic effects of adopting both
types of innovation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It does so using the
global economy-wide computable general equilibrium model known as
GTAP. The results suggest the welfare gains are potentially very large,
especially from golden rice and that—contrary to the claims of numerous
interests—those estimated benefits are diminished only slightly by the
presence of the European Union’s current barriers to imports of GM foods.
In particular, if SSA countries impose bans on GM crop imports in an
attempt to maintain access to EUmarkets for non-GM products, the loss to
domestic consumers due to that protectionism boost to SSA farmers is far
more than the small gain in terms of greater market access to the EU.
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1. Introduction
Over the 13,000 years since humankind began to move beyond just
hunting and gathering, one of the most important micro-contribu-
tors to economic progress has been innovation in food production
(Diamond, 1998). Even as recently as the period since 1960 the
world has seen a major example of that in the so-called ‘green
revolution’. That revolution initially brought higher-yielding semi-
dwarf wheat and rice varieties to vast areas of Asia and other
developing regions that had access to irrigation or reliable rainfall,
but then it extended to include the adoption of modern varieties
also of numerous other grains, root crops and protein crops. The
adaption of modern varieties to local conditions by national
scientists, and the subsequent gradual adoption by farmers of
them, was by no means uniform. In particular, Africa lagged far
behind Asia and Latin America, contributing importantly to that
continent’s relatively slow growth in per capita food production
particularly up to the 1990s (Evenson and Gollin, 2003). Given
that Africa now accounts for one-third of the world’s people
living on less than $1 a day—up from one-tenth two decades ago
(Chen and Ravallion, 2004)—and that the vast majority of those
poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa are dependent on agriculture for
their livelihood and much of their food, this has been an
opportunity lost for a whole generation for hundreds of millions
of people.
In the latter 1990s another agricultural revolution began, this time
involving biotechnology including genetic modification (the so-
called gene revolution). Genetically modified (GM) crops have great
potential for farmers and ultimately consumers. Benefits for
producers could include greater productivity and less occupational
health and environmental damage (e.g., fewer pesticides), while
benefits to consumers could include not only lower food prices but
also enhanced attributes (e.g., ‘nutriceuticals’). While traditional
biotechnology improves the quality and yields of plants and
animals through, for example, selective breeding, genetic engineer-
ing enables direct manipulation of genetic material. In this way the
new GM technology has the potential to accelerate the development
process by shaving years off R&D programmes. Protagonists argue
that genetic engineering also entails a more controlled transfer of
genes because the transfer is limited to a single or just a few selected
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genes, whereas traditional breeding risks transferring unwanted
genes together with those desired.
This new agricultural biotechnology has been adopted very
rapidly where it has been allowed to flourish, but to date that is in
just a handful of countries (most notably the USA, Canada and
Argentina) and so involves only their most important crops (namely
maize, soybean and canola) plus cotton.2 GM varieties of wheat, rice
and other food crops would be ready for release were it not for
opposition to GM technology by vocal consumer and environmen-
tal groups, particularly inWestern Europe, concerned about the GM
crops’ potentially adverse impacts on food safety (e.g., ‘Will they
cause cancer?’) and the environment (e.g., ‘Will they lead to
herbicide-resistant superweeds?’). The EU responded to pressure
from these groups by placing in October 1998 a de factomoratorium
on the production and use of GM varieties other than the tiny
number approved to that date. Since April 2004 that moratorium
has been replaced by GM labelling laws that are so strict as to have
almost the same restrictive effect on trade.
As a result of the EU de factomoratorium, the US share of the EU’s
maize imports has fallen to virtually zero (from around two-thirds
in the mid-1990s, close to the US share of world exports), as has
Canada’s share of EU canola imports (from 54% in the mid-1990s).
The fall has been less dramatic in the case of soybean products, but
in all three cases the GM-adopting countries have lost market share
to GM-free suppliers. As a consequence, countries exporting food
products fear that they will find food-importing countries dis-
counting or denying access to their products if their farmers adopt
GM technology or even if they import GM food (because of the risk
of contamination of domestically produced non-GM food).
This new biotechnology therefore raises a number of dilemmas
for African countries. Will the resulting decline in international food
prices raise or lower national economic welfare in Africa (e.g.,
because they are net importers or exporters of food)? If the EU were
to retain its barriers to imports of GM food despite challenges from
the US and others via the WTO (see Anderson and Jackson, 2005),
would African food exporters gain more from reduced competition
in that market than from trying to develop and adopt new GM crop
2 China and a few other countries including South Africa also have adopted GM
cotton. That crop is ignored in what follows since the focus of this paper is on
food.
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varieties? If that improved competitiveness required in turn a ban
on imports of all food and feed from GM-adopting countries by
those African countries so as to avoid contamination (as ostensibly
feared by Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe when they were
offered food aid from the US in 2002), would the domestic economic
loss to net buyers of food outweigh the gains to farmers in those
countries? How would a country’s welfare be affected if a
neighbouring country (e.g., South Africa) chose to adopt GM
varieties of key foods?
This paper attempts to address these empirical questions. It
does so by using a well-received simulation model of the global
economy known as GTAP in which the South African Customs
Union (SACU), the other members of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), and the rest of Sub-Saharan
Africa are among the separately identified regions. The model’s
base simulation, calibrated to 1997 just before the EU de facto
moratorium was imposed, is compared with a series of alternative
scenarios. After discussing the results, and key caveats including
the practicality of GM adoption in Africa, the paper concludes by
drawing out welfare and poverty implications for Sub-Saharan
African countries under various trade and technology policy
scenarios.
2. Model Methodology
We use a well-received empirical model of the global economy
(the GTAP model) to examine the effects of some countries
adopting the new GM technology without and then with govern-
ment and consumer responses in other countries. Being a general
equilibrium model, GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project)
describes both the vertical and horizontal linkages between all
product markets both within the model’s individual countries
and regions as well as between countries and regions via their
bilateral trade flows. The GTAP Version 5.4 database used for
these applications draws on the global economic structures and
trade flows of 1997, the time of the take-off in adoption of GM
crop varieties. To make the results easier to digest, the GTAP
model has been aggregated to depict the global economy as
having 17 regions and 14 sectors (with the focus on the primary
agricultural sectors affected by the GM debate and their related
388 K. Anderson, L.A. Jackson
processing industries).3 We have undertaken further sectoral
disaggregation of the database by separating golden rice4 and
other GM crop varieties from non-GM varieties of rice, oilseeds,
coarse grains and wheat. There are five types of productive factors
in the version of the GTAP model used here: skilled labour,
unskilled labour, agricultural land, other natural resources, and
other (non-human) capital. All factors except natural resources
(which are specific to primary production) are assumed to be
perfectly mobile throughout the national economy but immobile
internationally.
We have modified the GTAPmodel so it can capture the effects of
productivity increases of GM crops, consumer aversion to consum-
ing first-generation GM products, and substitutability between GM
and non-GM products as intermediate inputs into final consumable
foods.
The simulations use a standard, neoclassical GTAP closure. This
closure is characterised by perfect competition in all markets,
flexible exchange rates and fixed endowments of labour, capital,
land and natural resources. One outcome of this specification is that
wages are flexible and the labour (and other factor) markets operate
at full employment. In addition, investment funds are re-allocated
among regions following a shock so as to return to equalised
expected rates of return.
3 The GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model is a multi-regional, static,
applied general equilibrium model based on neo-classical microeconomic theory
assuming perfect competition, constant returns to scale and full employment of
all productive factors which are immobile internationally. International goods
and services trade is described by an Armington specification, which means that
products are differentiated by country of origin. See Hertel (1997) for
comprehensive model documentation and Dimaranan and McDougall (2002)
for details of the GTAP 5.4 database used here. The model is solved with
GEMPACK software (Harrison and Pearson, 1996). Welfare decomposition
follows Harrison et al. (1999). Previous uses of the GTAP model in assessing the
economic implications of GM crop adoption include Nielsen and Anderson
(2001), van Meijl and van Tongeren (2002), Jackson and Anderson (2003) and
Huang et al. (2004b).
4 Golden rice is a GM variety that may have no farm productivity attributes but has
the potential to improve health significantly in regions where rice is or could be a
dietary staple for poor people, through providing pro-vitamin A. The latter
characteristic is the result of golden rice being genetically engineered to contain a
higher level of beta-carotene in the endosperm of the grain. See Ye et al. (2000) and
Beyer et al. (2002).
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2.1 Production
Traditionally, to distinguish GM from non-GM productivity,
outputs of the GM-adopting sectors are each subdivided into GM
and non-GM product. Except for golden rice, an output-augment-
ing, Hicks-neutral productivity shock is implemented on the GM
varieties of these commodities to capture their higher farm
productivity.5 This assumes that GM technology uniformly reduces
the level of primary factors needed per unit of food crop output.
When a region does not adopt GM technologies, no regional factor
productivity shock is included and there is no distinction between
GM and non-GM production in these regions. In the constant-
elasticity-of-substitution production nest, producers choose first
between imported and domestic inputs according to the model’s
Armington (1969) elasticities, and then choose whether or not to use
GM or non-GM intermediate inputs in their production of final
goods.
However, as discussed in more detail elsewhere (Anderson
et al., 2004), second-generation GM varieties such as golden rice
require a treatment different from first-generation GM varieties.
We assume there is no net difference between producing second-
generation GM crops and their non-GM counterpart in terms of
farm productivity: any input saving is assumed to be absorbed in
the cost of segregation and identity preservation. The motivation
for developing country farmers to adopt nutritionally enhanced
varieties has to come from their higher valuation in the domestic
market in competition with other GM and traditional varieties,
net of the extra cost of segregation and identity preservation of
these superior varieties when they are marketed outside the farm
household.
Data on global adoption of GM technologies reveal a wide
divergence in adoption across countries. In the first simulation, we
assume that 75% of oilseed production in the USA, Canada and
Argentina is GM and that 45% of US and Canadian and 30% of
Argentinean rice, wheat and coarse grain production is GM. (Since
these countries are already GM adopters in coarse grain and
oilseeds, we assume they would also be the earliest adopters of GM
5 This is an improvement over earlier work by ourselves (e.g., Anderson and
Nielsen 2001; Nielsen and Anderson 2001) and others where all production was
assumed to switch to GM varieties in the adopting countries.
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rice and wheat once they are ready for commercial release. Those
countries’ farmers have shown no interest in golden rice, so it is
assumed their adoption is restricted to other GM rice varieties.) In
the scenarios involving GM rice adoption in developing countries,
we consider two cases: one in which 45% of the rice crop is grown
with GM seed that enhances farm productivity, and the other in
which 45% of the rice crop uses golden rice seed. The latter set of
adopting farmers is assumed to be able to segregate their golden
rice from other rice in order to market this product based on its
enhanced nutritional composition.6 We also consider a case where
some developing countries adopt GM varieties of coarse grains,
oilseeds and wheat that are assumed to account for 45% of their
production of those crops.
2.2 Productivity Shocks
The simulations assume GM technical change in grain and oilseed
production is Hicks-neutral, involving an output-augmenting
productivity shock of 7.5% for coarse grain, 6% for oilseeds and
5% for wheat and rice (Table 1). Alternative simulations were
conducted to assess the importance of altering these assumptions to
allow for biased technical change, but because the welfare results
are not substantially different we retained the simpler Hicks-neutral
assumption.7
While GM rice and wheat has not yet been commercialised,
around the world several varieties have been approved for field
trials and environmental release. A recent study found that, even
under conservative adoption and consumption assumptions,
introducing golden rice in the Philippines could decrease the
number of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) lost due to vitamin
A deficiency by between 6 and 47% (Zimmermann and Qaim, 2002).
That is equivalent to an increase in unskilled labour productivity of
up to 0.53%. Based on those findings, Anderson et al. (2005)
represent these health impacts with an assumed 0.5% improvement
in unskilled labour productivity in all sectors of golden
6 The cost of segregation would be smaller, the more rice is consumed by the
producing household or sold to local consumers, as is common in developing
countries. This situation is thus qualitatively different from that analysed by
Lapan and Moschini (2004) where the costs of segregation and identity
preservation are assumed to be significant.
7 The results from sensitivity analysis are available from the authors.
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rice-adopting Asian developing economies. Given the low nutrition
levels of poor workers in Africa, and the fact that if golden rice were
to be adopted in Asia and Africa, then nutritionally enhanced GM
varieties of wheat and other foods would soon follow, we assume
the productivity of unskilled labour would rise by 2% following
adoption of second-generation GM crops. We also assume no direct
impact on the productivity of skilled labourers, who are rich enough
to already enjoy a nutritious diet.8 And to continue to err on the
conservative side, we assume second-generation GM crop varieties
are no more productive in the use of factors and inputs than
traditional varieties net of segregation and identity preservation
costs, even though there is evidence to suggest they may indeed be
input-saving.9
Table 1: Assumed Impact of Adoption of First-generation GM Crop Technology on Factor
Productivity forGMVarietiesRelative toCurrentNon-GMVarieties, by Sector (%difference)
GM coarse grains GM oilseeds GM wheat GM rice
(non-golden)
Land 7.5 6 5 5
Skilled labour 7.5 6 5 5
Unskilled labour 7.5 6 5 5
Capital 7.5 6 5 5
Natural resources 7.5 6 5 5
Source: Authors’ assumptions, based on literature reviews by Marra et al. (2002),
Zimmermann and Qaim (2002), Huang et al. (2004a,b) and FAO (2004).
8 There would also be non-pecuniary benefits of people feeling healthier, and less
expenditure on health care, but these too are ignored so as to continue to err on
the conservative side. For more on this and other aspects of golden rice and other
biotech R&D outcomes, see Conway (2003).
9 Bouis (2002) and Welch (2002) suggest nutritionally enhanced rice and wheat
cultivars aremore resistant to disease, their roots extendmore deeply into the soil
so they require less irrigation and are more drought resistant, they release
chemical compounds that unbind trace elements in the soil and thus require less
chemical inputs, and their seeds have higher survival rates.
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2.3 Consumption
In order to capture consumer aversion to GM products in OECD
countries, elasticities of substitution between GM and non-GM
products in those regions are set at low levels.10 Once nutritionally
enhanced GM grain varieties are introduced, consumers in Sub-
Saharan Africa are assumed to have a preference for them over their
traditional counterparts. For simplicity and to continue to be
conservative, we ignore the possibility that consumers of inferior
grains might shift to these new grains and instead just represent the
consumer response as involving demand for traditional rice or
wheat shrinking by 45% so that the nutritionally enhanced variety
accounts for 45% of total demand for that cereal in adopting
countries. And we assume the consumer health benefits of second-
generation GM varieties are confined to the adopting countries.
3. Scenarios
The base simulation in the GTAPmodel, which is calibrated to 1997,
is compared with four sets of simulations. The first set examines the
effects of adoption of currently available GM varieties of maize,
soybean and canola11 by the current adopters (Argentina, Canada
and the USA) without and then with the EU de factomoratorium on
GMOs in place, before examining what impact adoption in South
Africa would have, and then the benefits from adoption elsewhere
in Africa, and then in the rest of the world as well:
Sim 1a: the USA, Canada and Argentina adopt GM varieties of
coarse grain and oilseeds that raise farm productivity there;
Sim 1b: as for Sim 1a þ the EU bans imports of those crops from
GM-adopting countries;
Sim 1c: as for Sim 1aþ SACU adopts GM varieties of coarse grain
and oilseeds;
10 Elasticities of substitution are included in the computation of the distribution of
GM and non-GM consumption of coarse grains, oilseeds, wheat and rice within
each region. Systematic sensitivity analysis indicates that varying the elasticities
of substitution for these commodities has minimal impact on the model solution.
Again, details are available from the authors.
11 This has to be done in a slightly inflating way in that the GTAP model is not
disaggregated below ‘coarse grains’ and ‘oilseeds’. However, in the current
adopting countries (Argentina, Canada and the US), maize, soybean and canola
are the dominant coarse grains and oilseed crops.
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Sim 1d: as for Sim 1b þ SACU adopts GM varieties of coarse
grain and oilseeds;
Sim1e:all countriesadoptGMvarietiesofcoarsegrainandoilseeds.
The second set of simulations involves a repeat of the first set
except that China and India are assumed to join America in
adopting, and GM (non-golden) rice and wheat are assumed to be
made available to those adopting countries’ farmers:
Sim 2a: the USA, Canada and Argentina plus China and India
adopt GM varieties of coarse grain, oilseeds, rice and wheat
(without EU moratorium);
Sim 2b: as for Sim 2a þ the EU bans imports of those crops from
GM-adopting countries;
Sim 2c: as for Sim 2a þ SACU adopts GM varieties of coarse
grain, oilseeds, rice and wheat;
Sim 2d: as for Sim 2b þ SACU adopts GM varieties of coarse
grain, oilseeds, rice and wheat;
Sim 2e: all countries adopt GM varieties of coarse grain, oilseeds,
rice and wheat.
The third set of simulations focuses on what difference it would
make if SADC countries other than SACU members either banned
imports of GM varieties or allowed their farmers and consumers
access to them:
Sim 3a: as for Sim 1d þ Rest of SADC also bans imports of those
crops from GM-adopting countries;
Sim 3b: as for Sim 2d þ Rest of SADC also bans imports of those
crops from GM-adopting countries;
Sim 3c: as for Sim 2d þ Rest of SADC adopts GM varieties of
coarse grain, oilseeds, rice and wheat.
Finally, the fourth set of simulations repeats some of the second
set except the GM rice and wheat is nutritionally enhanced and so it
boosts all unskilled labour productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa by
2% instead of boosting just farm productivity:
Sim 4a: as for 2aþ Sub-Saharan Africa adopts second-generation
GM rice and wheat that enhances health and thereby
the productivity of unskilled labour in the region;
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Sim 4b: as for 4a þ the EU bans imports of those crops from GM-
adopting countries.
These simulations, which are summarized in Table 2, are clearly
only a small subset of possible simulations, but they are chosen to
illustrate the main choices facing Sub-Saharan Africa.
4. Results
The estimated national economic welfare effects of the first set of
these shocks are summarized in Table 3. Assuming no adverse
reaction by consumers or trade policy responses by governments,
the first column shows that the adoption of GM varieties of coarse
grains and oilseeds by the USA, Canada and Argentina would have
benefited the world by almost US$2.3 billion per year, of which $1.3
billion is reaped in the adopting countries while Asia and the EU
enjoy most of the rest (through an improvement in their terms of
trade, as net importers of those two sets of farm products). The only
losers in that scenario are countries that export those or related
competing products. Australia and New Zealand lose slightly (not
shown in Table 3) because their exports of grass-fed livestock
products are less competitive with now-cheaper grain-fed livestock
products in GM-adopting countries. But so too do the non-SADC
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa as a group, although again only
slightly. South Africa gains slightly as a net importer of coarse
grains and oilseeds, while the net welfare effect on the rest of SADC
is negligible.
Column 2 of Table 3 shows the effects when the EU’s moratorium
is taken into account. The gains to the adopting countries are one-
third less, the EU loses instead of gains (not accounting for the value
EU consumers place on being certain they are not consuming food
containing GMOs), and the world as a whole would be worse off (by
$1.2 billion per year, instead of better off by $2.3 billion, a difference
of $3.5 billion) because the gains from the new technology would be
more than offset by the massive increase in agricultural protection-
ism in the EU due to its import restrictions on those crops fromGM-
adopting American countries. For SSA, however, welfare would be
$20 million per year greater than in Sim 1a because in Sim 1b
African farmers are able to sell into the EU with less competition
from the Western Hemisphere.
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Table 2: Simulation Scenarios Considered
Scenario USA, CAN
þ ARG
adopt GM
coarse
grain and
oilseeds
USA, CAN,
ARG, China
þ India
adopt
GM coarse
grain, oilseeds,
rice and wheat
SACU
adopts
GM
coarse
grain and
oilseeds
SACU
adopts
GM coarse
grain,
oilseeds,
rice and
wheat
EU bans
imports
of affected
crops from
GM
adopters
SADC – SACU
bans imports
of affected
crops from
GM
adopters
All SADC
adopts GM
coarse grain,
oilseeds, rice
and wheat
All Sub-Saharan
Africa adopts
GM coarse
grain and
oilseeds
þ2nd
generation
rice and wheat
All countries
adopt GM
coarse grain
and oilseeds
All countries
adopt GM
coarse grain,
oilseeds, rice
and wheat
1a £
1b £ £
1c £ £
1d £ £ £
1e £
2a £
2b £ £
2c £ £
2d £ £ £
2e £
3a £ £ £ £
3b £ £ £ £
3c £ £ £
4a £ £
4b £ £ £
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Table 3: Estimated Economic Welfare Effects of GM Coarse Grain and Oilseed Adoption by Various Countries
(US$ Million per Year)
USA, CAN and ARG adopt USA, CAN, ARG þ SACU
adopt
All countries adopt
Without policy
response
With EU
moratorium
Without policy
response
With EU
moratorium
Without policy
response
Sim 1a Sim 1b Sim 1c Sim 1d Sim 1e EV as % of GDP
(sim 1e)
Change in economic welfare (equivalent variation in income, $m)
SACU 3 7 9 5 9 0.01
Rest of SADC 0 2 0 3 18 0.04
Rest of SSA 22 12 21 14 42 0.03
Argentina 312 247 312 246 287 0.11
Canada 72 7 72 7 65 0.01
USA 939 628 939 627 897 0.01
EU-15 267 23145 269 23179 595 0.01
Rest of world 700 1,027 225 1,001 2,204 0.02
World 2,290 21,243 2,300 21,276 4,047 0.013
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 are the same as columns 1 and 2
except that SACU is assumed also to adopt GM coarse grains and
oilseeds. In the absence of the EU moratorium this would benefit
SACU an extra $6 million per year while helping the rest of SSA by
$1 million (compare Sims 1a and 1c). However, in the presence of
the EU ban, SACUwould be $2 million worse off and the rest of SSA
$3 million better off (compare Sims 1b and 1d).
Column 5 of Table 3 assumes the world relaxes about GMOs and
all countries adopt the technology. Global welfare in that case is
almost double what it is with just the current three adopters
(compare with Sim 1a). South Africa’s welfare is the same in this as
in Sim 1c, but welfare in the rest of SSA is enhanced considerably
(by $46 million per year compared with the current situation as
depicted in Sim 1b) and, as a proportion of GDP, those economies
gain three to four times as much as SACU (see final column of
Table 3).
The above numbers are small, but recall they refer to adoption
only of GM varieties currently in production. If GM rice and wheat
adoption also were to be allowed, global welfare would be
increased by nearly twice as much (compare bottom right-hand
corners of Tables 3 and 4: $7.5 versus $4.0 billion), because the
market for those two crops is even larger than for coarse grains and
oilseeds. Again, though, SSA economies would gain little if they do
not participate, with the benefit in terms of enhanced competitive-
ness from abstaining in the presence of the EU moratorium being
very minor relative to the foregone productivity benefits from
adopting the new technology.12
This last point is reinforced in Table 5 where, in Sims 3a and 3b,
SADC members other than SACU place a ban on imports of
products that may contain GMOs, while in Sim 3c they embrace the
technology. In the first two cases SACU is made slightly worse off
relative to Sims 1d and 2d (by $3–4 million per year), while the rest
of SADC is hurt even more (by $5–14 million per year) assuming
consumers there are indifferent to consuming food that may contain
GMOs; and other SSA welfare remains virtually the same. By
12 In this as in all the simulations, there is an implicit assumption that, if
government policies allowed, the technology would be developed by biotech
corporations for each of the regions concerned and the GM seed varieties would
be sold to adopting farmers to provide the net productivity gains reported in
Table 1. Those seed firms are too small a fraction of the global economy to
include in the model.
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Table 4: Estimated Economic Welfare Effects of GM Coarse Grain, Oilseed, Rice and Wheat Adoption by Various Countries
(Equivalent Variation in Income, US$ Million)
USA, CAN, ARG, CHN and
IND adopt
USA, CAN, ARG, CHN, and
IND þ SACU adopt
All countries adopt
Without policy
response
With EU
moratorium
Without policy
response
With EU
moratorium
Without policy
response
Sim 2a Sim 2b Sim 2c Sim 2d Sim 2e EV as % of GDP
(sim 2e)
Change in economic welfare (equivalent variation in income, $m)
SACU 7 11 13 10 15 0.01
Rest of SADC 0 4 0 4 22 0.05
Rest of SSA 5 23 6 24 165 0.12
Argentina 350 285 350 285 312 0.12
Canada 83 223 83 223 63 0.01
USA 1,045 754 1,045 754 1,041 0.01
China 841 833 841 832 899 0.25
India 669 654 669 654 669 0.14
EU-15 355 24,717 358 24754 810 0.01
Rest of world 964 1,322 953 1,285 3,509 0.03
World 4,308 2892 4,319 2928 7506 0.024
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.
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Table 5: Estimated Economic Welfare Effects of GM Adoption with SADC other than SACU either Banning or Adopting GM Varieties
(US$ Million per Year)
USA, CAN, ARG and
SACU adopt GM coarse
grains and oilseeds
USA, CAN, ARG, CHN,
IND and SACU adopt
GM coarse grains, oilseeds,
rice and wheat
As for 3b þ Rest of SADC adopts
same GM commodities
With EU and SADC
(excl SACU) moratoria
With EU and SADC
(excl SACU) moratoria
With EU moratorium
Sim 3a Sim 3b Sim 3c
Change in economic welfare
(equivalent variation in income,
$m)
SACU 2 6 10
Rest of SADC 22 210 26
Rest of SSA 14 25 25
Argentina 246 284 285
Canada 7 224 223
USA 626 756 754
China 111 833 833
India 3 654 654
EU-15 23181 24760 24750
Rest of world 889 1290 1286
World 21287 2946 2900
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.
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contrast, if the rest of SADC were to adopt GM varieties along with
SACU, as in Sim 3c, its welfare would be boosted by $26 million
instead of reduced by $10 million and SACU’s would be up by a
further $4 million annually—despite the assumed continuance of
the EU moratorium.
It is instructive to focus also on the impacts on domestic food
prices and quantities in the Rest of SADC in this third set of
simulations. Table 6 reveals the extent to which domestic food
production would be greater but by more in Sim 3b where the Rest
of SADC chooses not to adopt, and to ban GM imports, than in Sim
3c where it embraces the new technology. This is the standard
consequence of increasing agricultural protectionism, reflected also
in the greater decline in net imports of food in Sim 3b than 3c, and in
the increase in domestic food prices in Sim 3b compared with their
decline in Sim 3c.
Finally, consider the situation where the GM varieties of rice and
wheat that are adopted in Sub-Saharan Africa are nutritionally
enhancing to the extent of boosting the health and hence
productivity of unskilled workers regardless of occupation, rather
than raising farm productivity as with first-generation GM
varieties. Table 7 suggests this second-generation GM technology
could have a major impact on poor people’s welfare: its estimated
gain is 18 times as great as it would be if the GM varieties were just
farm productivity enhancing (compare Sims 2e and 4a). And again,
this startling result is independent of whether the EU maintains its
current moratorium (compare Sims 4a and 4b).
The welfare results for all of these simulations are decomposed
for Sub-Saharan African regions in Table 8, to show the extent to
which they derive from productivity growth, from a change in the
region’s international terms of trade, or from a change in the
economic efficiency of resource allocation in the region given its
policy distortions. All three elements play a role in determining the
overall welfare impacts, but the contribution of productivity growth
dominates in all regions where GM adoption occurs—especially in
the case of nutritionally enhancing varieties.
5. Caveats
As with all CGE modelling results, the above are subject to a
number of qualifications. One has to do with the way consumer
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Table 6: Trade and Domestic Production, Price and Trade Impacts in SADC other than
SACU (Rest of SADC) of GM Adoption, with Rest of SADC either Banning or also
Adopting GM Varieties (% Changes)
USA, CAN, ARG,
CHN, IND, SACU
adopt GM coarse grains,
oilseeds, rice and wheat
USA, CAN, ARG, CHN, IND,
SACU adopt GM coarse
grains, oilseeds, rice and
wheat þ Rest of SADC
adopts
With EU and Rest
of SADC moratoria
With EU moratorium
Sim 3b Sim 3c
Production
Coarse grains 1.0 0.4
Oilseeds 5.8 1.8
Rice 1.5 0.9
Wheat 15.6 0.7
Meat 0.0 0.3
Domestic market
prices
Coarse grains 0.3 20.8
Oilseeds 0.3 21.2
Rice 0.3 21.0
Wheat 0.4 20.3
Meat 0.2 0.0
Imports
Coarse grains 225.7 22.2
Oilseeds 252.5 20.6
Rice 26.9 24.1
Wheat 221.2 20.2
Meat 20.4 20.9
Exports
Coarse grains 1.2 4.2
Oilseeds 9.2 12.0
Rice 7.0 11.7
Wheat 1.7 20.3
Meat 0.6 1.4
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.
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preferences are handled. The estimated market and welfare effects
vary with the elasticities of substitution assumed between GM and
non-GM varieties of a product. Anderson et al. (2002) examine this
issue and show that this is unlikely to be an important issue because
results do not vary much as those elasticities (which are set very low
for Europe and Northeast Asia and moderate elsewhere) are
altered.
Of more importance is that we have no satisfactory way of
valuing any loss of welfare for consumers who would like to avoid
consuming foods containing GMOs but cannot if such foods are
introduced into their marketplace without credible labelling. Since
we have assumed that loss to be zero, we are overstating the gains
from adopting this technology to that extent. An alternative way to
cope with this issue is to introduce a cost of segregation and identity
preservation. We did that implicitly by choosing conservative cost
savings due to the new technology, saying they were net of any
fees charged for segregation and identity preservation. According
to Burton et al. (2002) such fees may be as high as 15% of farm
gate price, which would make it unprofitable to market many
GM varieties if that was a required condition of sale. Others
suggest those costs could be miniscule—at least in developed
Table 7: Estimated Economic Welfare Effects of GM Crop Adoption with Sub-Saharan
Africa’s being Second-generation, Nutritionally Enhanced Rice and Wheat
(US$ Million per Year)
USA, CAN, ARG, CHN, and IND adopt first-generation
GM coarse grains, oilseeds, rice and wheat and SSA
adopts second-generation rice and wheat
Without EU moratorium With EU moratorium
Sim 4a Sim 4b
Change in economic welfare (equivalent variation in income, $m)
SACU 1786 1789
Rest of SADC 403 407
Rest of SSA 1421 1439
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.
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Table 8: Decomposition of National Economic Welfare Effects Due to GM Adoption under
Various Simulationsa
(Equivalent Variation in Income, US$ Million)
Allocative
efficiency impact
Terms of
trade impact
Productivity
growth impact
Total
impact
SACU
Sim 1a 3 1 0 3
Sim 1b 2 5 0 7
Sim 1c 2 0 7 9
Sim 1d 22 21 7 5
Sim 1e 3 0 7 9
Sim 2a 4 3 0 7
Sim 2b 3 9 0 11
Sim 2c 3 2 9 13
Sim 2d 21 3 8 10
Sim 2e 4 3 8 15
Sim 3a 23 23 7 2
Sim 3b 23 1 8 6
Sim 3c 21 3 8 10
Sim 4a 216 22 1549 1786
Sim 4b 215 28 1549 1789
Rest of SADC
Sim 1a 0 0 0 0
Sim 1b 0 3 0 2
Sim 1c 0 0 0 0
Sim 1d 0 3 0 3
Sim 1e 2 23 19 18
Sim 2a 0 0 0 0
Sim 2b 0 4 0 4
Sim 2c 0 0 0 0
Sim 2d 0 4 0 4
Sim 2e 2 22 22 22
Sim 3a 29 7 0 22
Sim 3b 221 12 0 210
Sim 3c 0 21 22 22
Sim 4a 43 222 382 403
Sim 4b 43 218 382 407
Rest of SSA
Sim 1a 0 22 0 22
Sim 1b 1 9 0 12
404 K. Anderson, L.A. Jackson
economies—on the grounds that such segregation is increasingly
being demanded by consumers of many conventional foods
anyway (e.g., different grades or varieties or attributes of each
crop) so themarginal cost of expanding such systems to handle GM-
ness would not be great, at least in countries that have already
shown a willingness to pay for product differentiation.
The version of the GTAP database used in the above modelling
does not include tariff preferences enjoyed by Africans exporting to
the EU. In so far as they enjoy preferences on the products
considered above, then African exporters are currently receiving the
domestic EU price minus trading costs (including the share of the
tariff rent enjoyed by the importing firms). That price would be
raised by the EU moratorium, but whether that rise would be
greater or less than the rise in the international price of GM-free
varieties sold to the EU underMFN conditions is unclear. In practice
this issue is likely to be of minor importance though, for two
reasons. On is that the EU’s MFN tariffs on coarse grains
Table 8 (continued)
Allocative
efficiency impact
Terms of
trade impact
Productivity
growth impact
Total
impact
Sim 1c 1 22 0 21
Sim 1d 2 9 0 14
Sim 1e 2 25 45 42
Sim 2a 3 1 0 5
Sim 2b 4 16 0 23
Sim 2c 3 2 0 6
Sim 2d 5 17 0 24
Sim 2e 7 25 163 165
Sim 3a 2 10 0 14
Sim 3b 5 17 0 25
Sim 3c 6 17 0 25
Sim 4a 211 2396 1887 1421
Sim 4b 28 2383 1888 1439
Source: Authors’ GTAP model simulation results.
a See the previous four tables for the descriptions of each of the simulations. The
welfare decomposition follows Harrison et al. (1999).
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and oilseeds are low and hence so is the margin of preference. The
other is that many exporters find the rules of origin so complicated
that it is cheaper for them just to pay the MFN import duty rather
than try to take advantage of preferences.
In all these simulations we assume for simplicity that there are no
negative environmental risks net of positive environmental benefits
associated with producing GM crops, and that there is no
discounting and/or loss of market access abroad for other food
products because of what GM adoption does for a country’s generic
reputation as a producer of ‘clean, green, safe food’.
We have ignored the owners of intellectual property in GM
varieties, and simply assumed the productivity advantage of GM
varieties is net of the higher cost of GM seeds. In so far as that
intellectual property is held by a firm in a country other than theGM-
adopting country, then the gain from adoption is slightly overstated
in the adopting country (and very slightly understated for the home
regions of the relevant multinational biotech companies).
It is difficult to know how close to the mark is our assumed boost
to unskilled labour productivity following adoption of second-
generation GM varieties. But even if it is a gross exaggeration,
discounting heavily the massive magnitude of the estimated
welfare gain from adopting such varieties would still leave us
with a large benefit—particularly bearing in mind that developing
countries are being offered this technology at no cost by its private
sector developers, and that we have included no valuation of the
non-pecuniary gain in well-being for sufferers of malnutrition. The
cost of adapting the off-the-shelf technology to local conditions in
Africa may well be non-trivial, however, and may require a better-
functioning agricultural research system than has operated in the
past four decades, as evidenced by Africa’s relatively poor take-up
of the previous green revolution—see Evenson and Gollin (2003).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the above comparative
static modelling assumes first-generation GM technology delivers
just a one-off increase in total factor productivity (TFP) for that
portion of a crop’s area planted to the GM varieties. But what is
more likely is that, if/when the principle of GM crop production is
accepted, there would be an increase in the rate of agricultural TFP
growth into the future. Similarly, second-generation GM varieties
with additional health attributes such as those associated with
golden rice would be quicker in coming on stream the more
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countries embraced the technology. And biotech firms would be
encouraged to invest more in non-food GM crop varieties too
(adding to the success already achieved with GM cotton) if there
was an embracing of currently developed GM crop varieties by Sub-
Saharan African and other developing countries. Hence the present
value of future returns from GM adoption may be many times the
numbers shown above. For that reason, care is needed in
interpreting cases where our results suggest that when rich
countries introduce trade barriers against GM products, food-
importing developing countries benefit. This is because our analysis
does not take into account that moratoria have slowed the
investment in agricultural biotechnology, and so reduced future
market and technological spillovers to developing countries from
that prospective R&D.
6. Conclusions
From the viewpoint of Sub-Saharan Africa, the above results are
good news. TheGMcrop technology promisesmuch to the countries
willing to adopt these new varieties. The first-generation, farm-
productivity enhancing GM varieties alone will boost welfare in the
adopting countries, and those welfare gains could be multiplied—
perhaps many fold—if second-generation GM varieties such as
golden ricewere also to be embraced. Those estimated gains are only
slightly lower if the EU’s policies continue to effectively restrict
imports of affected crop products from adopting countries. More
importantly, Sub-Saharan African countries do not gain if they
impose bans on GM crop imports even in the presence of policies
restricting imports from GM-adopting countries: the consumer
loss net of that protectionism boost to Sub-Saharan African farmers
is more than the small gain in terms of greater market access to
the EU.
The stakes in this issue for Sub-Saharan Africa are thus very high,
with welfare gains that could alleviate poverty directly and
substantially in those countries willing and able to adopt this new
GM food crop technology. African countries need to assess whether
they share the food safety and environmental concerns of
Europeans regarding GMOs. If not, their citizens in general, and
their poor in particular, have much to gain from adopting GM crop
varieties and especially second-generation ones. Unlike for North
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America and Argentina, who are heavily dependent on exports of
maize and oilseeds, the welfare gains from GM crop adoption by
Sub-Saharan African countries would not be greatly jeopardised by
rich countries banning imports of those crop products from the
adopting countries.
References
Anderson, K. and L.A. Jackson (2005) ‘What’s Behind GMO
Disputes?’, World Trade Review, 4 (2) July.
Anderson, K. and C.P. Nielsen (2001) ‘GMOs, Trade Policy, and
Welfare in Rich and Poor Countries’, in K. Maskus and J. Wilson
(eds), Quantifying the Impact of Technical Barriers to Trade: Can it be
Done, Chap. 6, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.
Anderson, K., C.P. Nielsen and S. Robinson (2002) ‘Estimating the
Economic Effects of GMOs: the Importance of Policy Choices and
Preferences’, in R.E Evenson, V. Santaniello and D. Zilberman
(eds), Economic and Social Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology,
Chap. 20, London: CAB International.
Anderson, K., L.A. Jackson and C.P. Nielsen (2005) GM Rice
Adoption: Implications for Welfare and Poverty Alleviation,
Journal of Economic Integration, 20 (forthcoming).
Armington, P.A. (1969) ‘A Theory of Demand for Products
Distinguished by Place of Production’, IMF Staff Papers, 16:
159–78.
Beyer, P., S. Al-Babili, X. Ye, P. Lucca, P. Schaub, R. Welsch and
I. Potrykus (2002) ‘Golden Rice: Introducing the Beta-carotene
Biosynthesis Pathway into Rice Endosperm by Genetic Engin-
eering to Defeat Vitamin A Deficiency’, Journal of Nutrition, 132:
506–10.
Bouis, H.E. (2002) ‘Plant Breeding: A New Tool to Fight Micro-
nutrient Malnutrition’, Journal of Nutrition, 132: 491S–4S.
Burton, M., S. James, R. Lindner and J. Pluske (2002) ‘A Way
Forward for Frankenstein Food’, in V. Sananiello, R.E. Evenson
and D. Zilberman, Chapter 1, London: CAB International.
Chen, S. and M. Ravallion (2004) How Have the World’s Poorest
Fared Since the Early 1980s?, mimeo, Washington DC: World
Bank, April, www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/
408 K. Anderson, L.A. Jackson
Conway, G (2003) ‘From the Green Revolution to the Biotechnology
Revolution: Food for Poor People in the 21st Century’, paper
presented at the Directors’ Forum, Woodrow Wilson Inter-
national Center for Scholars, 12 March.
Diamond, J. (1998)Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody
for the Last 13,000 Years, London: Vintage.
Dimaranan, B.V. and R.A. McDougall (eds) (2002) Global Trade,
Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 5 Data Base, West Lafayette:
Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.
Evenson, R.E. and D. Gollin (2003) ‘Assessing the Impact of the
Green Revolution, 1960-2000’, Science, 300: 758–62.
FAO (2004) The State of Food and Agriculture 2003-04: Agricultural
Biotechnology, Rome: FAO.
Harrison, W.J. and K.R. Pearson (1996) ‘Computing Solutions for
Large General Equilibrium Models Using GEMPACK’, Compu-
tational Economics, 9: 83–172.
Harrison, W.J., Horridge, J.M. Pearson, K.R (1999) ‘Decomposing
Simulation Results with Respect to Exogenous Shocks’, Working
Paper No. IP-73, Centre of Policy Studies and the IMPACT
Project, Monash University, May.
Hertel, T.W. (ed.) (1997) Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Appli-
cations, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Huang, J., H. Hu, S. Rozelle and C. Pray (2004a) ‘GM Rice in
Farmer Fields: Assessing Productivity and Health Effects in
China’, mimeo, Beijing: Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy,
October.
Huang, J., R. Hu, H. van Meijl and F. van Tongeren (2004b)
‘Biotechnology Boosts to Crop Productivity in China: Trade and
Welfare Implications’, Journal of Development Economics, 75 (1):
27–54.
Jackson, L.A. and K. Anderson (2003) ‘Why Are US and EU Policies
Toward GMOs So Different?’, AgBioForum, 6 (3): 96–100.
Lapan, H.E. and G.C. Moschini (2004) ‘Innovation and Trade with
Endogenous Market Failure: The Case of Genetically Modified
Products’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86 (3):
634–48.
Marra, M., P. Pardey and J. Alston (2002) ‘The Payoffs to
Agricultural Biotechnology: An Assessment of the Evidence’,
Some Implications of GM Food Technology Policies for Sub-Saharan Africa 409
AgBioForum, 5 (2): 43–50, http://www.agbioforum.org/v5n2/
v5n2a02-marra.pdf
Nielsen, C.P. and K. Anderson (2001) ‘Global Market Effects of
European Responses to Genetically Modified Organisms’, Welt-
wertschaftliches Archiv, 137 (2): 320–46.
Qaim, M. and D. Zilberman (2003) ‘Yield Effects of Genetically
Modified Crops in Developing Countries’, Science, 299: 900–2.
van Meijl, H. and F. van Tongeren (2002) ‘International Diffusion
of Gains from Biotechnology and the European Union’s
Common Agricultural Policy,’ paper presented at the 5th
Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Taipei,
Taiwan.
Welch, R.M. (2002) ‘Breeding Strategies for Biofortified Staple Plant
Foods to Reduce Micronutrient Malnutrition Globally’, Journal of
Nutrition, 132: 495S–9S.
Ye, X., S. Al-Babili, A. Kolti, J. Zhang, P. Lucca, P. Beyer and
I. Potrykus (2000) ‘Engineering the Provitamin A (Beta-carotene)
Biosynthetic Pathway into (Carotenoid-free) Rice Endosperm’,
Science, 287: 303–5.
Zimmermann, R. and M. Qaim (2002) ‘Projecting the Benefits of
Golden Rice in the Philippines’, ZEF Discussion Paper No. 51,
Bonn: Center for Development Research, September.
410 K. Anderson, L.A. Jackson
